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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

ERIC JARVIS WARREN,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 20000744-CA
Priority No. 2

:

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
The State's argument that the "totality of circumstances in
this case," Appellee's Br. 13, supports the reasonableness of
questioning Appellant Eric Jarvis Warren ["Mr. Warren"] beyond
the scope of the initial traffic stop is not supported by the
record. Officer Nathan Swensen ["Officer Swensen"] testified
that, although he observed an individual leaning into the
passenger side door of Mr. Warren's car late at night in a
downtown location, this was not part of the reason for the
subsequent traffic stop. R. 130 [15-16]. "xThe length and scope
of the detention must be 'strictly tied to and justified by' the
circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible,'" State
v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, Ull, 410 Utah Adv. Rep. 28 (citations
omitted) , and in this case that circumstance was the traffic
stop. Thus, Officer Swensen's questioning violated Mr. Warren's
constitutional guarantees of protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures.

The subsequent frisk of Mr. Warren also violated Mr.
Warren's guarantees of protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures because a frisk may be performed only when the
police officer has a "reasonable, articulable suspicion that the
suspect is armed and presently dangerous." State v. Chapman, 921
P.2d 446, 454 (Utah 1996) (citation omitted). Officer Swensen
testified that he did not believe Mr. Warren was armed and the
frisk was performed as a matter of routine. R. 130 [10-11, 20] .
In arguing that the frisk was justified the State points out that
there are general risks inherent in traffic stops and Mr.
Warren's car was being impounded due to a traffic violation.
Appellee's Br. 13-14. However, the authority to perform a frisk
"must be narrowly drawn," Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968),
and the general risks inherent in traffic stops do not justify
performing a frisk.
Finally, it is not necessary to remand this case for
findings regarding the issue of inevitable discovery, as
suggested by the State. The State already argued this issue
before the trial court, relevant evidence was presented, and
relevant findings of fact were made. On the basis of the record,
this court may make conclusions of law regarding the inevitable
discovery issue, as it did in the case of State v. Northrup, 756
P. 2d 1288, 1293-94 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). Thus, a remand for
2

further findings on this issue is not necessary.
ARGUMENT
I.

OFFICER SWENSEN'S TESTIMONY ESTABLISHES THAT THE QUESTIONING
OF MR. WARREN REGARDING HIS PRESENCE IN THE AREA AND EARLIER
ACTIVITIES EXCEEDED THE REASONABLE SCOPE OF THE TRAFFIC STOP
AND WAS NOT NECESSARY TO EFFECTUATE THE PURPOSE OF THE STOP
The State's argument that the "totality of circumstances in

this case" supports the reasonableness of the questioning,
Appellee's Br. 13-14, overlooks Officer Swensen's testimony
regarding the questioning. Without including that testimony in
its analysis, the State points out that, before stopping Mr.
Warren, Officer Swensen observed uan unidentified individual
leaning into defendant's passenger side door from the curb for no
apparent legitimate reason, given the deserted, non-residential
downtown location, and the unusually early hour." Id. at 13. The
State further argues that, based upon Officer Swensen's
experience,1 this behavior suggested that a drug or prostitution
crime was afoot. Id.
However, Officer Swensen's observations were ultimately not
part of his reason for stopping Mr. Warren. During the Motion to
Suppress Hearing held 18 February 2000, Officer Swensen testified
as follows:

1

Officer Swensen testified that he had been working for the
Salt Lake Police Department for almost two years and had been
"working on the streets" for nearly 14 months. R. 13 0 [13] .

3

Q [by defense counsel] : And it was at some point you say
[Mr. Warren] signaled a lane change without - or he made a lane
change without signaling?
A [by Officer Swensen]: Correct.
Q: And the reason you pulled him over was because of that?
A: Correct.
Q: Now, weren't you also pulling him over because you wanted
to explore what you felt was a suspicious circumstance?
A: No.
Q: That didn't have anything to do with it?
A: Had to do with the traffic stop.
R. 130 [15-16]. When further questioned regarding his
conversation with Mr. Warren, Officer Swensen testified:
Q [by defense counsel]: And again, this whole discussion
about where [Mr. Warren] was, what he was doing, who this person
was that he dropped off, had nothing to do with the reason you
say you stopped him?
A [by Officer Swensen]: Correct.
Q: Totally unrelated?
A: Correct.
Q: Wasn't necessary to complete that stop?
A: No.
Q: Okay. Now, after having this discussion, how long would

4

you say the discussion took place for?
A: A minute or two.
R. 130 [18].
In light of Officer Swensen's testimony, his questioning
regarding Mr. Warren's presence in the area and earlier
activities was not "reasonably related in scope to the traffic
violation which justified [the stop] in the first place." State
v. Lopez, 873 P.2d 1127, 1132 (Utah 1994). Additionally, the
xxx

length and [the] scope of the detention'" was not

ux

strictly

tied to and justified by' the circumstances which rendered its
initiation permissible." Id. (quoting State v. Johnson, 805 P.2d
761, 763 (Utah 1991)(citation omitted)).
The State further argues that Mr. Warren's failure to
produce a valid driver's license "only added to the suspicious
circumstances" justifying Officer Swensen's questioning.
Appellee's Br. 13. However, there is no indication that Mr.
Warren's failure to produce a valid driver's license created a
suspicion of anything other than that Mr. Warren was driving
without a valid driver's license.2 This is not a basis for

2

It is a class C misdemeanor to drive a motor vehicle when
the driver's license is denied, suspended, disqualified, or
revoked. Utah Code Ann. § 53-3-227 (1998) . It is a class C
misdemeanor to display a canceled, denied, revoked, suspended, or
disqualified driver license as a valid driver license. Utah Code
Ann. § 53-3-229 (Supp. 2000)

5

suspecting more serious criminal activity and questioning Mr.
Warren about it. "If there is investigative questioning that
detains the driver beyond the scope of the initial stop, it 'must
be supported by reasonable suspicion of more serious criminal
activity.'" State v. Chevre, 2000 UT App 06, HlO, 994 P.2d 1278
(quoting Lopez, 873 P.2d at 1132).
The State also indicates that "if Officer Swensen had held
off the questioning until after he initiated the computer checks
[regarding the status of Mr. Warren's license] and was awaiting
those results, there would be no issue as to the propriety of the
questioning.,/ Appellee's Br. 14. So, to avoid

ux

elevating form

over substance,'" Officer Swensen's questioning of Mr. Warren
should not be found to be unreasonable. Id. (quoting State v.
James, 2000 UT 80, 1(13, 405 Utah Adv. Rep. 31) .3 Although Mr.

3

The State further implies that because "mere questioning"
does not constitute "either a search or a seizure," Appellee's
Br. 11, constitutional guarantees against unreasonable searches
and seizures do not apply. For support, the State cites Florida
v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) and United States v.
Shabazz, 993 F.2d 431, 435 (5th Cir. 1993).
This implication is incorrect. xxxThe United States Supreme
Court has held that 'stopping an automobile and detaining its
occupants constitute [s] a seizure' within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment, 'even though the purpose of the stop is limited
and the resulting detention quite brief.'" Lopez, 873 P.2d at
1131 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979)).
Accord State v. Hansen, 2000 UT App 353, fl2, 410 Utah Adv. Rep.
28.

6

Warren may not have been delayed an additional length of time if
the questioning had occurred while Officer Swensen was awaiting
the results of the computer check, it is not only the length of
the stop, but also the scope of the stop which must be
"reasonably related" to the traffic violation which u"justified
the interference in the first place.'" State v. Hansen, 2000 UT
App 353, %9 (quoting State v. Patefield, 927 P.2d 655, 657 (Utah
Ct. App. 1996)) . Questioning Mr. Warren about his presence in the
area and earlier activities went beyond the scope of
investigating the original traffic violation and Mr. Warren's
failure to produce a valid license.
Finally, the State argues that "even if the questioning is
deemed objectively unreasonable, it was not the questioning that
led to the discovery of cocaine on defendant's person --it was
the subsequent protective frisk." Appellee's Br. 14-15. The case
of State v. Hansen, which this court recently decided, is
directly on point. In that case the defendant was stopped for
making an improper left turn and for failing to have car
insurance. Id. at %2. After running a check and determining that
the defendant had a valid driver's license and no outstanding
warrants, the police officer asked the defendant if he had any
"alcohol, weapons, or drugs" in his car. Id. at 113-4. The
defendant replied that he did not have any. Id. The officer
7

searched the car anyway and found a homemade billy club and a
marijuana pipe. Id. at ^5. Then the officer searched the
defendant and found a substance later identified as
methamphetamine. Id.
The defendant was charged with illegal possession of a
controlled substance, and he moved to have evidence of the
methamphetamine suppressed because he had been illegally detained
by the officer's questioning. Id. at 1[l, 6. His motion was denied
and he was convicted. Id. In reversing his conviction, this Court
concluded that the defendant "was illegally detained when Officer
Huntington asked him questions that were not reasonably related
in scope to the traffic violation which justified the initial
seizure." Id. at 1 16. Thus, the questioning served as a basis
for suppressing evidence of the methamphetamine. Therefore, the
State's argument here that the questioning of Mr. Warren should
not be a basis for suppressing evidence of the controlled
substances fails.

II.

THE GENERAL RISKS INHERENT IN TRAFFIC STOPS DO NOT PROVIDE
OFFICER SWENSEN WITH A LEGAL BASIS FOR FRISKING MR. WARREN
WHERE THE OFFICER DOES NOT BELIEVE MR. WARREN IS CARRYING A
WEAPON AND FRISKS MR. WARREN AS A MATTER OF ROUTINE PRIOR TO
IMPOUNDING HIS CAR FOR A TRAFFIC VIOLATION
The State's argument that Officer Swensen reasonably frisked

Mr. Warren because traffic stops in general are potentially
8

dangerous, Appellee's Br. 15-16, and because Mr. Warren's car was
being impounded due to his lack of a valid driver's license, Id. ,
is not supportable. In making its argument, the State points out
that police "are entitled to take reasonable precautionary
actions to ensure their safety during the course of a traffic
investigation." Appellee's Br. 16 (citation omitted). The State
also indicates that, statistically, there is a "real and
reasonable" concern of danger in traffic stops. Id. (citations
omitted).
These arguments do not apply the proper test for
reasonableness. The core test for determining whether a frisk is
reasonable is a balancing test where the need to search is
weighed against the personal invasion involved in the search.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968); State v. White, 856 P.2d
656, 665 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) . As the United States Supreme Court
explained in Terry v. Ohio, u[e]ven a limited search of the outer
clothing for weapons constitutes a severe, though brief,
intrusion upon cherished personal security, and it must surely be
an annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating experience."
Terry, 392 U.S. at 24-25. Thus, to justify a frisk there must be
the "immediate interest of the police officer in taking steps to
assure himself that the person with whom he is dealing is not
armed with a weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be used
9

against him." Terry, 3 92 U.S. at 23.
In applying the holdings of Terry v. Ohio, the Utah Supreme
Court said there must be a "reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous." State v.
Chapman, 921 P.2d 446, 454 (Utah 1996)(citation omitted).4 This
is because the authority to "permit a protective frisk for
weapons 'must be narrowly drawn.7" White, 856 P.2d at 665
(quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 27) . Therefore, in deciding to frisk,
u

a police officer [must have] specific articulable facts which

reasonably warrant the officer to believe that the suspect is
dangerous and may gain immediate

control

of weapons, [then] the

officer can search the suspect and those nearby areas where a
weapon may be hidden." State v. Strickling, 844 P.2d 979, 983-84
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (citing Michigan v. Long 463 U.S. 1032, 104950 (1983)).5

4

This principal has been codified at Utah Code Ann. § 77-716 (1999)(UA peace officer who has stopped a person temporarily
for questioning may frisk the person for a dangerous weapon if he
reasonably believes he or any other person is in danger.")
5

See also Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 94 (1979) ("The
'narrow scope' of the Terry exception does not permit a frisk for
weapons on less than a reasonable belief or suspicion directed at
the person to be frisked.")
The State argues that Mr. Warren's citations to Ybarra are
not persuasive because that case did not involve "the dangers
inherent in a traffic stop scenario." Appellee's Br. 17. However,
the circumstances of Ybarra presented even more risks to officers

10

Under this analysis, frisks such as the one performed on Mr.
Warren by Officer Swensen are not proper. Officer Swensen
testified that he did not believe Mr. Warren had a weapon, R. 130
[2 0] , and that the reason he asked Mr. Warren to step out of the
car was to sign a citation. R. 130 [10] . Officer Swensen added:
Whenever I pull somebody out of a car, I perform a
Terry frisk just to see if there's weapons. . . . Also
because of the fact that with [there] being drug
activity and prostitution and so on, people that are
involved in that usually carry weapons. So with that in
mind, also for the fact that I always do that, perform
the Terry frisk when I pull somebody out of a car,
that's why I did it.
R. 130 [10-11].
The State asserts that Officer Swensen's suspicion of drug
or prostitution activity combined with the inherent dangers of

than those involved in Mr. Warren's traffic stop. In Ybarra,
officers had a search warrant, issued upon probable cause, to
search the tavern and the bartender for xx'[h]eroin, contraband,
other controlled substances, money, instrumentalities and
narcotics, paraphernalia used in the manufacture, processing and
distribution of controlled substances.'" Ybarra, 444 U.S. at 88.
Earlier, an informant had seen "fifteen to twenty-five tin-foil
packets" similar to the packets used in a "common method of
packaging heroin" on the bartender. Id. at 87-88.
Thus, in Ybarra officers faced not only the general risks of
searching the tavern and bartender, but the possibility of
discovering a large-scale drug operation. See Wayne R. LeFave,
Search and Seizure: A Treatise On the Fourth Amendment §
9.5(a) (3rd ed. 1996) (Advising that the crime of "dealing in large
quantities of narcotics" is one of violence). Therefore, Ybarra
is not distinguishable simply because it did not involve a
traffic stop.

11

traffic stops justified this action. Appellee's Br. 18.
With regard to the inherent dangers of traffic stops, these are
not enough to give a police officer "reason to believe that he is
dealing with an armed and dangerous individual . . . ." Terry,
3 92 U.S. at 27. Nor do the general dangers of a traffic stop
create "specific reasonable inferences," Id. that an individual
is armed and dangerous. At any rate, Officer Swensen testified
that he had no such suspicion in this case. R. 130 [10-11, 20] .
Although the State supports its argument by citing to
Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), which describes
dangers inherent in traffic stops, Appellee's Br. 16, that case
is not on point. Mimms . involved the balancing of a police
officer's need to question an individual against the intrusion
involved in asking him to step out of his car. Id. at 109-10. The
legality of an invasive frisk was not involved. Id. Therefore,
the State's reliance upon that case is not persuasive.
Finally, Officer Swensen's suspicion of drug or prostitution
activity does not provide the justification needed for a Terry
frisk. What is required is a "reasonable, articulable suspicion
that the suspect is armed and presently dangerous." Chapman, 921
P.2d at 454 (citation omitted) . Police officers may not perform a
frisk for any other purpose, including to verify drug or
prostitution activity. Commentary has even suggested that u[t]he
12

Terry rule should be expressly limited to investigation of
serious offenses" in part to take away the temptation for police
to frisk individuals as part of a "fishing expedition [] for
contraband. Permitting stops for narcotics offenses presents the
most obvious temptation to abuse the frisk as an occasion for
searching for contraband." LaFave, Search and Seizure: A Treatise
on the Fourth Amendment § 9.2 (c) (footnote omitted).6 Thus, the

6

The full text of the recommendation reads as follows:

The Terry rule should be expressly limited to investigation
of serious offenses. Admittedly, it is not easy to articulate
offense-category limitations as a matter of Fourth Amendment
interpretation. It is important, nonetheless, that such
limitations be developed, for the following reasons:
(1) Terry utilizes a balancing approach whereby the need to seize
and search is balanced against the degree of intrusion which will
result. The Court stressed that the officer acted "to protect
himself and others from possible danger, and took limited steps
to do so." The emphasis, therefore, was upon the need for
immediate action, which simply is not present as to minor crimes.
(2) Any extraordinary grant of police authority ought to be
circumscribed in such a way that meaningful review is possible
and so that the public is not apprehensive about police excesses.
The circumstances which might lead an officer to suspect that a
person is committing such a crime as loitering, gambling or
disorderly conduct "are sufficiently diverse and diffuse that
their inclusion might mean a large and hard-to-review expansion
of coercive authority." And it must be remembered that under a
reasonable suspicion test it is inevitable that a significant
number of innocent persons will be stopped. But "if persons come
to understand that they are being subjected to inconvenience only
in cases where most persons would find such action proper and
desirable, the cost of resentment might well be reduced."
(3) Most important, as Judge Friendly emphasized, barring the

13

evidence seized by Officer Swensen as a result of this frisk
should have been suppressed by the trial court.

Ill

THIS CASE SHOULD NOT BE REMANDED FOR CONSIDERATION OF THE
STATE'S INEVITABLE DISCOVERY ARGUMENT BECAUSE THAT ARGUMENT
WAS GIVEN BELOW, RELEVANT EVIDENCE WAS PRESENTED, AND
FINDINGS OF FACT REGARDING THE RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES WERE
ISSUED BY THE TRIAL COURT
Because the State presented its inevitable discovery

argument below, a remand is not necessary and conclusions of law
should be drawn from the record already before this Court. The
State presented its inevitable discovery argument during oral
arguments on Mr. Warren's Motion to Suppress on 20 March 2000. R.
131 [12-13] . The State briefed the trial court about inevitable
discovery by outlining legal arguments to the court and referring
to testimony presented during the motion to suppress hearing held
18 February 2000. R. 131 [12-13]. At the motion to suppress
hearing, Officer Swensen testified about events relevant to the

police from employing stop and frisk for such minor crimes as
possession of narcotics will remove the temptation for the police
to go on fishing expeditions for contraband. Permitting stops for
narcotics offenses presents the most obvious temptation to abuse
the frisk as an occasion for searching for contraband. There are,
to be sure, a number of means for dealing with the problem of
abuse of the frisk (as opposed to the stop) in regard to
narcotics. . . . However, . . . it is preferable to deal with
this problem by removing narcotics offenses from the scope of the
stop and frisk authority altogether.
LaFave, supra, § 9.2 (c) (footnote omitted).

14

inevitable discovery issue, including Mr. Warren's traffic stop,
detainment, arrest, and the impoundment of his car. R. 12 9 [222] .7 Additionally, the record includes the Information,8 Mr.
Warren's "Motion to Suppress Evidence Seized Illegally" and
supporting memorandum, and the State's asserted facts and
response. R. 14-16, 43-62. Finally, the trial judge issued
findings of fact relevant to the inevitable discovery issue,

7

Details from Officer Swensen testimony that are relevant to
the issue of inevitable discovery include:
- Officer Swensen ran a check on Mr. Warren's diver's
license, and found that his license had been denied because Mr.
Warren did not pay the reinstatement fees. R. 120 [7] .
- Officer Swensen decided to impound Mr. Warren's vehicle
because he did not have a valid driver's license. R. 120 [8] .
- Officer Swensen intended to cite Mr. Warren for failure to
turn, failure to signal before the turn, and driving without a
driver's license. R. 120 [8-9].
- Officer Swensen had Mr. Warren step out of the car to sign
the citation, and to inform him that the car would be impounded.
R. 120 [20].
- Mr. Warren informed Officer Swensen that the car belonged
to Mr. Warren's father. R. 120 [20].
- Officer Swensen did not intend to arrest Mr. Warren at
that time, and Mr. Warren would have been free to go. R. 120
[21] .
8

The Information includes a "Probable Cause Statement" which
indicates that Officer S. Wozab assisted Officer Swensen in
searching Mr. Warren's vehicle, and xx [u] nderneath the armrest on
the front seat, the Officers located a knife, two additional
pipes, filters, and a pen tube with residue." R. 16.

15

including the impoundment of Mr. Warren's car and arrest. R. 8284. 9
The State cites to State v. Topanotes, 2000 UT. App. 311,
408 Utah Adv. Rep. 8 (petition for cert, filed (No.

)), in

arguing that a remand for factual findings on the issue of
inevitable discovery is proper. Appellee's Br. 19. However, in
that case, the issue of inevitable discovery was raised for the
first time on appeal and was not presented below.10 Here, the

9

The findings of fact relevant to the issue of inevitable
discovery include:
(6) Officer Swensen then returned to his patrol car
and ran a license check on the defendant and
was informed that the defendant's license was denied for
reinstatement fees. Officer Swensen then re-approached the
vehicle and asked the defendant to step out of the car in
order to have him sign a citation for the traffic violations
and because he was going to impound the vehicle due to the
defendant's failure to have a valid license.
(7) When the defendant stepped out of the vehicle,
Officer Swensen as part of his routine performed a
"Terry" frisk for weapons. During the frisk a small
white plastic twist fell from beneath the defendant' s
sweat shirt. Believing the twist to be a controlled
substance, Officer Swensen placed the defendant under
arrest. A more thorough search was then performed
wherein additional controlled substances and a clear
glass pipe were found on defendant's person.
R. 83-84.
10

See Topanotes, 2000 UT
court ruled that the initial
inevitable discovery was not
Sampson, 808 P. 2d 1100, 1111

App 311, Kll ("Because the trial
detention was legal, the issue of
addressed below.") See also State v.
n.19 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (Remand
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issue of inevitable discovery was argued below, R. 131 [12-14],
relevant evidence was presented, R. 129 [2-22], and relevant
findings of fact were issued. R. 83-84. The only rulings required
now are conclusions of law, and a remand for those conclusions is
not necessary because they are granted no deference on appeal.11
Finally, this Court has readily examined the issue of
inevitable discovery where the record contains sufficient facts
to review it. In State v. Northrup, 756 P.2d 1288 (Utah Ct. App.
1988) , this Court found that money allegedly used in drug
distribution activity was the fruit of an illegal entry by police
officers, and the State did not show that the money would have
been inevitably discovered. Id. at 1295. There, relevant evidence
was already on record and this Court decided the issue of
inevitable discovery as a matter of law. Id.
In this case, the circumstances surrounding the discovery of
the controlled substances, Mr. Warren's lack of a valid driver's
license, the impoundment of Mr. Warren's vehicle, and Mr.

proper because Mt]he State had no occasion to argue either [the
"independent source doctrine' or the "inevitable discovery rule']
on appeal or below. Consequently, we are unable to determine
whether either of these exceptions might apply in this case to
some of the evidence which we might otherwise have to be
suppressed.")
11

State v. DeBooy, 2000 UT 32, \l, 996 P.2d 546; Salt Lake
City v. Davidson, 2000 UT App 12, 18, 994 P.2d 1283; State v.
Hinson, 966 P.2d 273, 275 (Utah Ct. App. 1998).
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Warren's arrest are already on record and the trial court has
already made findings of fact regarding these issues. Thus, this
court may properly decide the issue of inevitable discovery as a
matter of law, and a remand to the trial court for further
findings is not required.12

12

In his opening brief Mr. Warren argued that the discovery
of the controlled substances was not inevitable because it is not
clear that Mr. Warren's vehicle contained a concealed weapon and
he would have been arrested on that charge. Aplt. Br. 26-31. The
State asserted:
[D]efendant waived [this challenge] when he entered his
guilty plea to the cocaine charge without conditioning
it on the right to challenge the validity of the
concealed weapon charge. Defendant specifically
conditioned his guilty plea on the right to appeal the
trial court's denial of his motion to suppress . . .
Therefore, absent any challenge to the sufficiency of
the evidence to support the now dismissed concealed
weapon charge, it is assumed at this juncture that the
evidence was sufficient to support that charge.
Appellee's Br. 20 (citations omitted).
However, the State cites no authority for the novel
proposition that evidence for dismissed charges is assumed to be
sufficient to support the charge. Additionally, in State v.
Rivera, 943 P.2d 1344 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court
recognized that when a defendant enters a conditional plea of
guilty, reserving in the record the right to appeal any specified
pre-trial motion, the defendant "shall be allowed to withdraw the
plea" if the appeal is successful. Id. at 1345 (quoting Utah R.
Crim P. 11 (i)). In that event, the prosecutor will have the
option of offering a second plea bargain agreement, which may or
may not involve the dismissal of some of the original charges. In
due course, evidence may be presented at trial with regard to all
charges, and there is no presumption that evidence is assumed to
be sufficient for any charge.
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CONCLUSION
The trial court's conclusion that Officer Swensen's
questioning of Mr. Warren did not exceed the scope of the initial
traffic stop in violation of Mr. Warren's constitutional
guarantees of protection from unreasonable searches and seizures
was erroneous. The further conclusion that the subsequent frisk
did not -violate these same guarantees was also erroneous.
Therefore, the trial court's failure to suppress evidence on the
basis of these erroneous conclusions should be reversed.
Although the State argues that this case should be remanded
for further proceedings regarding the issue of inevitable
discovery, a remand is not necessary. The issue of inevitable
discovery was presented below and the record contains sufficient
information for this Court to decide this issue as a matter of
law.
Jjj±L
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day of February
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HEATHER JC&HNSON
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

At any rate, Mr. Warren specifically conditioned his plea
agreement on the outcome of this appeal. R. 103. The State below
raised the issue of "inevitable discovery." R. 131 [13]. To argue
that Mr. Warren is barred from addressing that argument
frustrates his ability to appeal the denial of his motion to
suppress evidence, which his plea agreement specifically allowed.
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